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Synchronization of neural networks has been used for novel public channel protocols in cryp-
tography. In the case of tree parity machines the dynamics of both bidirectional synchronization
and unidirectional learning is driven by attractive and repulsive stochastic forces. Thus it can be
described well by a random walk model for the overlap between participating neural networks. For
that purpose transition probabilities and scaling laws for the step sizes are derived analytically. Both
these calculations as well as numerical simulations show that bidirectional interaction leads to full
synchronization on average. In contrast, successful learning is only possible by means of fluctuations.
Consequently, synchronization is much faster than learning, which is essential for the security of the
neural key-exchange protocol. However, this qualitative difference between bidirectional and unidi-
rectional interaction vanishes if tree parity machines with more than three hidden units are used,
so that those neural networks are not suitable for neural cryptography. In addition, the effective
number of keys which can be generated by the neural key-exchange protocol is calculated using the
entropy of the weight distribution. As this quantity increases exponentially with the system size,
brute-force attacks on neural cryptography can easily be made unfeasible.
PACS numbers: 84.35.+i, 87.18.Sn, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Synchronization of neural networks [1, 2] is a special
case of an online learning situation. Two neural networks
start with randomly chosen uncorrelated weights. In each
time step they receive common input values, communi-
cate their output to each other and use a suitable learning
rule to update their weights. Finally, this process leads
to full synchronization of corresponding weights in both
networks.
In the case of simple networks, e.g., perceptrons, there
is no difference between unidirectional learning and bidi-
rectional synchronization. However, for tree parity ma-
chines (TPMs) an interesting phenomenon can be ob-
served: two neural networks learning from each other
synchronize much faster than a third network only lis-
tening to the communication [2].
This effect has been applied to solve a cryptographic
problem [3]: Two partners A and B want to exchange a
secret message over a public channel. In order to protect
the content against an attacker E, who is listening to the
communication, A encrypts the message. However, then
B needs A’s key for decryption. Without an additional
private channel A and B have to use a cryptographic key-
exchange protocol in order to generate a common secret
key over the public channel [4]. This can be achieved
by synchronizing two TPMs, one for A and one for B,
respectively. Of course, the attacker tries to determine
the key, too. But when learning is much slower than
synchronization, a tree parity machine (TPM) trained
by E is usually unable to synchronize before A and B
have finished the key exchange. Therefore the success
probability PE of an attack is very small [5].
Compared to other key-exchange algorithms neural
cryptography needs only simple mathematical opera-
tions, namely, adding and subtracting integer numbers.
Thus it is possible to use this key-exchange protocol in
devices with limited computing power. Computer scien-
tists are already working on hardware implementations,
which are part of an integrated circuit [6, 7, 8, 9].
Since the first proposal of the neural key-exchange pro-
tocol [3] most research has been focused on finding more
advanced methods for the partners [10, 11, 12] and the
attacker [13, 14, 15]. However, the results of simulations
and iterative calculations show the same scaling behavior
in almost all cases: the success probability PE decreases
exponentially with increasing synaptic depth L [5], while
the average synchronization time tsync only grows pro-
portional to L2 [16]. Therefore L plays the same role
in neural cryptography as the key length in traditional
cryptographic systems, which are based on number the-
ory [15].
In this paper we analyze the synchronization process of
two tree parity machines by the dynamics of the overlap
ρ. First, we repeat the definition of basic algorithms of
neural cryptography regarding synchronization and at-
tacks in Sec. II. In Sec. III we calculate the probabilities
of attractive and repulsive steps for different types of in-
teractions. The effect of these steps on the overlap is then
presented in Sec. IV. Here we show that the mechanisms
for unidirectional learning and bidirectional synchroniza-
tion are indeed different. In Sec. V we finally apply our
results on the dynamics of neural synchronization in or-
der to analyze the security of neural cryptography against
brute-force attacks. For that purpose we use the entropy
of the weight distribution to determine a scaling law for
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FIG. 1: A TPM with K = 3 and N = 4.
the number of keys which can be generated by the neural
key-exchange protocol.
II. NEURAL SYNCHRONIZATION
The TPMs used by partners and attackers in neural
cryptography consist of K hidden units, which are dis-
crete perceptrons with independent receptive fields. The
general structure of these networks is shown in Fig. 1.
All input values are binary,
xij ∈ {−1,+1} (1)
and the weights are discrete numbers between −L and
+L,
wij ∈ {−L,−L+ 1, . . . ,+L} . (2)
Here the index i = 1, . . . ,K denotes the ith hidden unit
of the TPM and j = 1, . . . , N the elements of each vector.
As usual, the output σi of a hidden unit is given by the
sign of the scalar product of inputs and weights
σi = sgn(wi · xi) (3)
and the total output τ of a TPM is defined as the product
(parity) of the hidden units
τ =
K∏
i=1
σi . (4)
The two partners start with secret random weight vec-
tors wA and wB, respectively. At each time step, a com-
mon public input vector x is generated, and the partners
exchange their output bits over the public channel. The
weight vectors are updated, and the process is iterated
until the partners have synchronized their weights which
then are used for the secret key. Note that the hidden
units σAi and σ
B
i are secret, this is an essential mechanism
for the security of neural cryptography.
We consider three different algorithms for the update
of the weights in each time step.
Synchronization:
w
A/B+
i = w
A/B
i + xiΘ(σ
A/B
i τ
A)Θ(τAτB) . (5)
In neural cryptography this algorithm is used by the part-
ners A and B. Here we only consider the random walk
learning rule [17], because all other suitable learning rules
(Hebbian and Anti-Hebbian) converge to it in the limit
N →∞ [15].
Simple attack:
w
E+
i = w
E
i + xiΘ(σ
E
i τ
A)Θ(τAτB) . (6)
This method is the simplest algorithm for unidirectional
learning. An attacker E can try it in order to synchronize
with the partners A and B by training a TPM with the
observed examples consisting of xi and τ
A [3].
Geometric attack: The geometric attack is the most
successful method for an attacker using only a single
TPM [13]. Here E tries to realize Eq. (5) without be-
ing able to interact with A. As long as τE = τA, this can
be achieved by just applying Eq. (6), as both learning
rules have the same effect. However, in the case τE 6= τA
E cannot stop A’s update of the weights. Instead of this
the attacker uses additional information contained in the
local fields
hEi =
1√
N
w
E
i · xi (7)
of the hidden units in order to correct the output τE of
her TPM. As a low absolute value |hEi | indicates a high
probability of σEi 6= σAi , the attacker flips the output of
the hidden unit with minimal |hEi | before applying the
learning rule (6).
In all three cases weights wij leaving the allowed range
between −L and +L are reset to the nearest boundary
value sgn(wij)L.
We analyze the process of synchronization using sim-
ulations of finite systems as well as iterative calculations
for N → ∞ [11, 18]. Correlations between the weight
vectors of two corresponding hidden units i are described
by (2L + 1)2 variables pia,b(t), which are defined as the
probability to find a weight with wAij(t) = a in A’s tree
parity machine and wBij = b in B’s TPM at time t:
pia,b(t) = P(w
A
ij(t) = a ∧ wBij(t) = b) . (8)
While these quantities are approximately given by the
frequency of the weight values wAij(t) and w
B
ij(t) in simu-
lations, we use the equations of motion given in Ref. [11]
to determine the time evolution of pia,b(t) directly in the
limit N →∞.
In both cases the standard order parameters [19],
which are commonly used for the analysis of online learn-
ing, can be calculated as functions of pia,b(t):
QAi =
1
N
w
A
i ·wAi =
L∑
a=−L
L∑
b=−L
a2 pia,b , (9)
QBi =
1
N
w
B
i ·wBi =
L∑
a=−L
L∑
b=−L
b2 pia,b , (10)
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FIG. 2: Effect of attractive (upper curve) and repulsive steps
(lower curve) for K = 3 and L = 10. Symbols represent
averages over 1000 simulations for N = 100. The lines denote
the corresponding results obtained by iterative calculations
for bidirectional synchronization and N → ∞.
RA,Bi =
1
N
w
A
i ·wBi =
L∑
a=−L
L∑
b=−L
a b pia,b . (11)
The level of synchronization between two corresponding
hidden units is then given by the normalized overlap [19]
ρi =
w
A
i ·wBi√
w
A
i ·wAi
√
w
B
i ·wBi
=
RA,Bi√
QAi Q
B
i
. (12)
Uncorrelated weight vectors at the beginning of the syn-
chronization process have ρi = 0, while the maximum
value ρi = 1 is reached for fully synchronized weights.
All the update algorithms discussed above can be de-
scribed by
w
A/B/E
i (t+ 1) = w
A/B/E
i (t) + f
A/B/E
i (t)xi(t) , (13)
where fA/B/E(t) is a function, which can take the values
−1, 0, or +1 according to the learning rule. Therefore
only three different effects are possible.
If fAi (t) = f
B
i (t) 6= 0, the weights in both correspond-
ing hidden units are moved in the same direction, so that
the overlap increases. This is called an “attractive step”
and can be described as anisotropic diffusion
pi+a,b =
1
2
(
pia+1,b+1 + p
i
a−1,b−1
)
, (14)
with reflecting boundary conditions. A sequence of these
attractive steps finally reaches a fixed point at ρi = 1.
If only the weights of one hidden unit are updated,
fAi (t)+ f
B
i (t) = ±1, the overlap ρi decreases on average.
This repulsive step performs a normal diffusion on a (2L+
1)× (2L+ 1) square lattice
pi+a,b =
1
4
(
pia+1,b + p
i
a−1,b + p
i
a,b+1 + p
i
a,b−1
)
. (15)
Of course, the boundary conditions are the same as
above. For a sequence of these repulsive steps the fixed
point of the overlap is located at ρi = 0.
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FIG. 3: Scaling functions for attractive steps. These results
were obtained in 1000 iterative calculations for bidirectional
synchronization with K = 3 and N → ∞.
For fAi (t) = f
B
i (t) = 0 the weights stay at their posi-
tion. Therefore the overlap does not change at all in this
step.
The remaining situation fAi (t) = −fBi (t) 6= 0 cannot
occur in any algorithm discussed above.
In general, the change of the overlap ∆ρ is not only a
function of the current overlap, but depends also on the
distribution of the weights and the type of step, which
is denoted by a subscript if necessary: the effect of an
attractive step is given by ∆ρa(ρ), while we use ∆ρr(ρ)
in the case of repulsive steps. Both quantities as well
as ∆ρ(ρ), which is not restricted to a particular type
of step, are random variables, whose properties can be
determined in simulations or iterative calculations.
However, for special cases an analytical solution can be
given by using Eqs. (14) and (15), taking the boundary
conditions into account. At the beginning of the synchro-
nization all weights are uniformly distributed, so that a
repulsive step does not change the overlap, but an at-
tractive step has a large effect:
∆ρa(ρ = 0) =
12L
(L+ 1)(2L+ 1)2
∼ 3
L2
, (16)
∆ρr(ρ = 0) = 0 . (17)
In contrast, one observes the opposite situation for fully
synchronized weights (ρ = 1):
∆ρa(ρ = 1) = 0 , (18)
∆ρr(ρ = 1) = − 3
(L+ 1)(2L+ 1)
∼ − 3
2L2
. (19)
Here an attractive step does not change the overlap at
all, but a repulsive step has its maximum effect.
Figure 2 shows that 〈∆ρa(ρ)〉 and 〈∆ρr(ρ)〉 do not de-
pend on the synchronization algorithm. Consequently,
the difference between unidirectional learning and bidi-
rectional synchronization is caused by the probability of
attractive and repulsive steps, but not their effects.
Using Eqs. (16) and (19) we obtain the rescaled quan-
tities 〈∆ρa(ρ)〉/∆ρa(0) and 〈∆ρr(ρ)〉/∆ρr(1) which be-
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FIG. 4: Scaling functions for repulsive steps. These results
were obtained in the same way as those shown in Fig. 3.
come asymptotically independent of L for large synaptic
depth. This is clearly visible in Figs. 3 and 4. Therefore
these two functions are sufficient to describe the effect of
attractive and repulsive steps.
III. TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
All algorithms for neural synchronization have in com-
mon that a repulsive step can only occur in the ith hidden
unit, if the two corresponding outputs σi are different.
The probability for this event is given by the well-known
generalization error [19]
ǫi =
1
π
arccos(ρi) (20)
of the perceptron. In the case of unidirectional learning
mutual interaction does not happen. Therefore the prob-
ability of repulsive steps for an simple attack is directly
given by Eq. (20):
PEr = ǫi . (21)
However, if both hidden units agree on σi, this does not
always lead to an attractive steps, because σi = τ is
another necessary condition for an update of the weights.
Thus the probability of attractive steps is given by
PEa =
1
2
(1− ǫi) (22)
in the case of learning with K > 1.
In contrast, mutual interaction is an integral part of
bidirectional synchronization. When τA 6= τB, that
move of the weights would have a repulsive effect in at
least one hidden unit, hence the partners A and B avoid
it by not updating the weights. However, when an even
number of hidden units disagrees on the output, one has
τA = τB and the learning rule is applied. Taking all pos-
sibilities into account, we find for K = 3 and identical
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FIG. 5: Probability that updating the weights has a repulsive
effect in one hidden unit for K = 3.
overlap (ǫi = ǫ) in all hidden units [11]:
PBa =
1
2
(1 − ǫ)3 + (1 − ǫ)ǫ2
(1− ǫ)3 + 3(1− ǫ)ǫ2 , (23)
PBr =
2(1− ǫ)ǫ2
(1− ǫ)3 + 3(1− ǫ)ǫ2 . (24)
Because of PBr ≤ PEr the partners have a clear advantage
over a simple attacker in neural cryptography.
However, E can do better by taking the local field into
account. Then the probability for σEi 6= σAi is given by
the prediction error [20]
ǫpi =
1
2
[
1− erf
(
ρi√
2(1− ρ2i )
|hi|√
Qi
)]
(25)
of a perceptron, which depends not only on ρi but also
on |hEi |. This quantity is a strictly monotonic decreasing
function of |hEi |. Therefore the geometric attack is often
able to find the hidden unit with σEi 6= σAi by searching
for the minimum of |hEi |. If all other units have σEj = σAj ,
then the probability for a successful geometric correction
[15] is given by
Pg =
∫ ∞
0
∏
j 6=i
(∫ ∞
hi
2√
2πQj
1− ǫpj
1− ǫj e
−
h2
j
2Qj dhj
)
× 2√
2πQi
ǫpi
ǫi
e
−
h2
i
2Qi dhi . (26)
Using this equation, we find for K = 3, geometric attack
and identical overlap in all hidden units
PEa =
1
2
(1 + 2Pg)(1 − ǫ)2ǫ+ 1
2
(1 − ǫ)3
+
1
2
(1 − ǫ)ǫ2 + 1
6
ǫ3 , (27)
PEr = 2(1− Pg)(1− ǫ)2ǫ + 2(1− ǫ)ǫ2 +
2
3
ǫ3 . (28)
While PEr for the geometric attack is lower than for the
simple attack, it is still higher than PBr . Thus even
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FIG. 6: Average change of the overlap for K = 3, L = 5,
and N = 100. Symbols represent results obtained in 1000
simulations.
this advanced algorithm for unidirectional learning has a
disadvantage compared to bidirectional synchronization,
which is clearly visible in Fig. 5.
IV. DYNAMICS OF THE OVERLAP
The results presented in Secs. II and III indicate
that the overlap ρ between two corresponding hidden
units performs a random walk with position dependent
step sizes (∆ρa(ρ), ∆ρr(ρ)) and transition probabilities
(Pa(ρ), Pr(ρ)). In order to understand the dynamics, we
calculate the average change of the overlap as a function
of ρ itself:
〈∆ρ〉 = Pa∆ρa + Pr∆ρr . (29)
This quantity is shown in Fig. 6. In the case of bidi-
rectional synchronization for K ≤ 3 it is always positive
until the process reaches an absorbing state at ρ = 1.
While the transition probabilities are independent of
L, the step sizes decrease asymptotically proportional to
L−2 according to Eqs. (16) and (19). That is why 〈∆ρ〉
is also proportional to L−2 and we find [5]
tsync ∝ 1〈∆ρ〉 ∝ L
2 (30)
for the average number of steps needed for full synchro-
nization. In fact, the probability Psync(t) to achieve iden-
tical weight vectors in A’s and B’s neural networks in at
most t steps is given by a Gumbel distribution
Psync(t) = e
−e
α−t
β
, (31)
with parameters α and β, which increase proportional to
L2 [16]. Thus A and B can generate a common key in a
short time with the help of neural cryptography.
Additionally, 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉 is independent of N except for
finite-size effects, which is clearly visible in Fig. 2. The
exact analytical calculation presented in Ref. [16] yields
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FIG. 7: Distribution of the overlap ρ at different time steps
for K = 3, L = 5, N = 100, and geometric attack. These
histograms show the result of 10 000 simulations.
tsync ∝ L2 lnN , because one has to wait until all cor-
responding weights have identical values. Consequently,
the partners are able to use rather large neural networks
without problems.
However, the situation is completely different in the
case of learning, e.g., for the simple attack or the ge-
ometric attack. Now there exists a fixed point of the
dynamics at ρf < 1 with 〈∆ρ(ρf )〉 = 0. In the case
of K = 3, which is the usual choice in regard to neural
cryptography, we find ρf ≈ 0.65 for the simple attack
and ρf ≈ 0.68 for the geometric attack.
As long as ρ < ρf the overlap increases on average, but
afterwards we observe a quasistationary Gaussian distri-
bution of ρ with mean value ρf and standard deviation
σf . This is clearly visible in Fig. 7. Consequently, the
absorbing state ρ = 1 can only be reached by fluctuations
of the overlap.
In order to determine the scaling of the standard devi-
ation σf of the overlap at the fixed point, we use a linear
approximation for the dynamics of ∆ρ around ρf without
taking boundary conditions into account
∆ρ(t) ≈ −γ[ρ(t)− ρf ] + δξ(t) . (32)
Here ξ(t) are random numbers with zero mean and unit
variance. The parameters are defined as
γ = − d
dρ
〈∆ρ(ρ)〉
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρf
, (33)
δ =
√
〈[∆ρ(ρf )]2〉 . (34)
In this model, the time evolution of the overlap is given
as the solution of Eq. (32)
ρ(t)− ρf =
t∑
i=1
(1 − γ)t−iδξ(t) (35)
using the initial condition ρ(0) = ρf , which is irrelevant
in the limit t → ∞. Therefore the fluctuations of the
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FIG. 8: Standard deviation of ρ at the fixed point ρf . Symbols
denote results averaged over 10 000 simulations using K = 3,
N = 1000, and unidirectional synchronization.
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FIG. 9: Probability distribution of tsync for K = 3, N = 1000,
and geometric attack. Symbols denote results averaged over
1000 simulations and the lines show fits with Eq. (38).
overlap in the stationary state are given by
σ2f =
∞∑
t=0
(1 − γ)2tδ2 = δ
2
2γ − γ2 . (36)
As the step sizes of the random walk in ρ-space de-
crease proportional to L−2 for L ≫ 1 according to
Eqs. (16) and (19), this is also the scaling behavior of
the parameters γ and δ. Thus we find
σf ∝ 1
L
(37)
for larger values of the synaptic depth. Although we
have neglected the more complex features of 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉,
this scaling behavior is clearly visible in Fig. 8. The
deviations for small values of L are caused by finite-size
effects.
Consequently, an attacker E is unable to synchronize
with A and B in the limit L → ∞, even if she uses the
geometric attack. This is also true for any other algo-
rithm, which has a fixed point at ρf < 1 in the dynamics
of the overlap.
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FIG. 10: Time constant tf for synchronization by fluctuations,
obtained from 1000 simulations of the geometric attack for
K = 3 and N = 1000. The line shows a fit with Eq. (42).
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FIG. 11: Average change of the overlap for bidirectional syn-
chronization, L = 10, and N = 1000. Symbols denote results
obtained from 100 simulations.
For finite synaptic depth, however, E has a chance
of getting beyond the fixed point at ρf by fluctuations.
The probability that this event occurs in any given step
is independent of t once the quasistationary state has
been reached. That is why PEsync(t) is no longer given by
Eq. (31), but described well for t≫ t0 by an exponential
distribution
PEsync(t) = 1− e
−
t−t0
tf , (38)
with time constant tf . This is clearly visible in Fig. 9.
Because of tf ≫ t0 one needs
〈tsync〉 ≈ tf (39)
steps on average to achieve full synchronization by uni-
directional learning.
In our simplified model with linear 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉 the average
time needed to reach ρ = 1 starting at the fixed point is
given by
tf ≈ 1
P (ρ = 1)
=
√
2π σf e
(1−ρf )
2
2σ2
f (40)
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FIG. 12: Average change of the overlap between A and C for
K = 3, L = 3, and N = 1000, obtained from 100 simulations
with 100 pairs of TPMs.
in the case of small fluctuations σf ≪ 1 − ρf , where we
can assume that the distribution of ρ is not influenced by
the presence of the absorbing state at ρ = 1. Hence we
expect
tf ∝ ecL
2
(41)
for the scaling of the time constant, as σf changes pro-
portional to L−1, while ρf stays nearly constant. And
Fig. 10 shows that indeed tf grows exponentially with
increasing synaptic depth
tf ∝ ec1L+c2L
2
. (42)
Thus the complexity of attacks on the neural key-
exchange protocol can be controlled by choosing L. Or
if E’s effort stays constant, her success probability drops
exponentially with increasing synaptic depth. This has
been observed in the case of the geometric attack [10]
and even for advanced methods [12, 15]. Consequently,
A and B can reach any desired level of security by in-
creasing L, as the complexity of a single key exchange
grows only proportional to L2.
However, this is not true for K > 3. As shown in
Fig. 11, a fixed point at ρf < 1 appears in the case of
bidirectional synchronization, too. Therefore Eq. (30) is
not valid any more and tsync increases exponentially with
L. That is why TPMs with four and more hidden units
cannot be used in the neural key-exchange protocol.
V. NUMBER OF KEYS
The state of the TPMs in each time step is a func-
tion of the secret initial conditions and the public se-
quence of input values. Therefore E can—in principle—
determine the possible weight configurations at synchro-
nization time tsync using her knowledge about the input
vectors xi(t). However, if the number of these keys is
large, a brute-force attack is unfeasible. Consequently,
0 200 400 600 800 1000
t
1.8
1.9
2
(S
 − 
S 0
) /
 (K
 N
) N = 10
2
N = 103
FIG. 13: Entropy per weight for A and C for K = 3 and
L = 3. Symbols denote results obtained in 100 simulations
with 100 pairs of TPMs.
this quantity is important for the security of neural cryp-
tography, too.
In order to estimate the number of keys, which can be
generated by the neural key-exchange protocol using a
given sequence of inputs, we look at the following system
consisting of two pairs of TPMs:
w
A+
i = w
A
i + xiΘ(σ
A
i τ
A)Θ(τAτB) , (43)
w
B+
i = w
B
i + xiΘ(σ
B
i τ
B)Θ(τAτB) , (44)
w
C+
i = w
C
i + xiΘ(σ
C
i τ
C)Θ(τCτD) , (45)
w
D+
i = w
D
i + xiΘ(σ
D
i τ
D)Θ(τCτD) . (46)
In this model all four neural networks receive the same
sequence of inputs, but both pairs communicate their
output bits only internally. Thus A and B as well as C
and D synchronize using the random walk learning rule,
while correlations caused by common inputs are visible
in the overlap ρACi . Because of the symmetry in this
system, ρADi , ρ
BC
i , and ρ
BD
i have the same properties as
this quantity, so that it is sufficient to look at ρACi only.
Of course, synchronization of networks which do not
interact with each other, e.g., A with C, is much more dif-
ficult and takes a longer time than performing the normal
key-exchange protocol. That is why we assume ρAB = 1
and ρCD = 1 for the calculation of 〈∆ρAC(ρAC)〉.
The result is shown in Fig. 12. Similar to the case of
unidirectional learning, there is a fixed point at ρACf < 1
for the dynamics of the overlap. Because of ρACf < ρ
AE
f
the probability for full synchronization in this case is
much smaller than for a successful simple attack. In fact,
large fluctuations which lead to equal weights without in-
teraction only occur in small systems. But the common
input sequence causes correlations between wAi and w
C
i
even for L ≫ 1 and N ≫ 1. Consequently, the number
of keys nkey is smaller than the number of weight config-
urations nconf = (2L+ 1)
KN of a tree parity machine.
We further analyze these correlations by calculating
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FIG. 14: Number of keys for K = 3, L = 1, and N = 2,
obtained by exhaustive search and averaged over 100 random
input sequences.
the entropy of the weight distribution
S = −KN
L∑
a=−L
L∑
c=−L
pa,c ln pa,c . (47)
Here pa,c is the probability to find w
A
ij = a and w
C
ij = c
by selecting a random weight. As the weights in each
tree parity machine alone stay uniformly distributed, the
entropy of two fully synchronized networks is given by
S0 = lnnconf = KN ln(2L+ 1) , (48)
which is also the entropy of a single TPM. Consequently,
the quantity S−S0 describes the correlations between the
weight vectors caused by the common input sequence. It
is proportional to the length of the generated crypto-
graphic key with any redundancy removed using a suit-
able encoding. Therefore the logarithm of the effective
number of keys is given by
lnnkey = S − S0 . (49)
We note, however, that the real number can be larger,
because not all possible weight configurations occur with
equal probability as keys. Therefore nkey is, in fact, a
lower bound for the number of different final configu-
rations. However, this quantity determines the security
against brute-force attacks, as an attacker tries the most
probable keys first.
Figure 13 shows the time evolution of this entropy.
First S − S0 shrinks linearly with increasing t, as the
overlap ρ between A and C grows while it approaches
the stationary state. This behavior is consistent with an
exponential decreasing number of keys, which can be di-
rectly observed in very small systems as shown in Fig. 14.
Of course, after the system has reached the fixed point
shown in Fig. 12, the entropy stays constant. We use this
minimum value in order to determine nkey.
It is clearly visible that there are two scaling relations
for S(t). The synchronization time tsync ∝ L2 is the time
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FIG. 15: Mutual information between A and C for K = 3,
N = 1000, obtained in 1000 simulations with 10 pairs of
TPMs.
scale of all processes related to the synchronization of tree
parity machines. It depends on the size of the learning
steps 〈∆ρ〉. Therefore the time needed to reach the fixed
point of ρACk is proportional to L
2, too.
Entropy is an extensive quantity. Thus S and S0 are
proportional to the number of weights N . Consequently
the number of keys, which can be generated by the neural
key-exchange protocol for a given input sequence, grows
exponentially with increasing N .
In order to determine the dependency between the
synaptic depth L and nkey we calculate the mutual infor-
mation
I = 2S0 − S (50)
between A and C, which is visible in the correlations of
the weight vectors. Using Eqs. (48) and (49) we find
I = − ln
(
nkey
nconf
)
. (51)
Therefore the number of keys is given by
nkey = nconf e
−I =
[
(2L+ 1)Ke−I/N
]N
. (52)
As shown in Fig. 15, I/N becomes asymptotically in-
dependent of the synaptic depth in the limit L→∞. Of
course, changing N does not influence I/N either, as it is
an intensive quantity. Extrapolating I yields the result
I ≈ 0.42N , (53)
which is valid for K = 3 and L≫ 1. Consequently, nkey
increases exponentially with N ,
nkey ≈
[
0.66(2L+ 1)3
]N
, (54)
so that there are always enough possible keys in larger
systems to prevent successful brute-force attacks on the
neural key-exchange protocol.
9VI. CONCLUSIONS
Synchronization of neural networks is a dynamical pro-
cess driven by attractive and repulsive stochastic forces.
While there is little difference between unidirectional
and bidirectional interaction in the case of simple net-
works such as perceptrons, more complex networks such
as TPMs show an interesting phenomenon: neural net-
works which interact with each other synchronize faster
than those, which are only trained with the examples
generated by others.
We have investigated the dynamics of this effect, which
is essential for the recently proposed neural key-exchange
protocol. In multilayer feed-forward networks the hid-
den units are not public. Therefore learning steps can
have either an attractive or repulsive effect. In both
cases the step size only depends on the synaptic depth
L and the time-dependent overlap ρ between the net-
works. Two neural networks, A and B, learning from
each other are able to skip unsuitable input vectors be-
cause of their interaction. That is why they avoid some
repulsive steps and have a clear advantage over a third
passive neural network E, which cannot influence A and
B. Consequently, A and B have a lower frequency of re-
pulsive learning steps than E, which causes the difference
between bidirectional synchronization and unidirectional
learning.
Using the step sizes ∆ρa(ρ), ∆ρr(ρ) and transition
probabilities Pa(ρ), Pr(ρ) we described the process of
neural synchronization as a random walk of the overlap ρ.
The most important properties of the dynamics are visi-
ble in the average change of the overlap 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉. In the
case of K = 3 and bidirectional interaction the dynamics
of the overlap has only one fixed point at ρ = 1. That
is why full synchronization is achieved after 〈tsync〉 ∝ L2
steps on average. However, for unidirectional learning or
mutual learning with K > 3 there is an additional fixed
point at ρf < 1, so that ρ = 1 is only reachable by fluc-
tuations. This leads to a different scaling behavior of the
average synchronization time 〈tsync〉 ∝ ec1L+c2L2 . Thus
the difference between bidirectional synchronization and
unidirectional learning can be controlled by choosing the
synaptic depth L.
An identical input sequence causes correlations be-
tween tree parity machines even without any other in-
teraction. Similarly to the case of unidirectional learning
there is a fixed point at ρf < 1. As the distance 1 − ρf
is larger, full synchronization without interaction is only
observed for very small TPMs. But the correlations re-
strict the number of different keys nkey, which can be
generated by the neural key-exchange protocol using a
certain input sequence and random initial weights. Both
the configuration space nconf = (2L+1)
KN and nkey grow
exponentially with increasing number of weights per hid-
den unit. Therefore a large value of N guarantees the
security of neural cryptography against brute-force at-
tacks and similar methods.
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